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Special interest groups play an important role in political decision making (Richard-
son, 1994, Potters and Sloof, 1996, Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad, 2008). Regard-
ing electoral competition - the focus of this study - a substantial number of theoretical
studies have appeared over the last two decades trying to explain the in￿ uence of in-
terest groups through campaign contributions, strategic information transmission,
and the like (for surveys, see Austen-Smith 1994, Grossman and Helpman, 2001,
van Winden, 2003, Prat, 2006). Thusfar, however, the impact of interest groups
on the political preferences and voting behavior of voters through the sociopsycho-
logical mechanism of identi￿cation has been neglected. This is in line with Akerlof
and Kranton￿ s (2000) more general observation that identity is ￿a missing motivation
in economists￿current description of organizations￿(op. cit., p.10). Their seminal
analysis suggests that this neglect is an important shortcoming of the present state
of the art. Identity refers to a person￿ s social category and self-image (e.g. being
￿ leftist￿ , ￿ rightist￿ , ￿ green￿ , or ￿ red￿ ) and it: ￿describes gains and losses in utility from
behavior that conforms or departs from the norms for particular social categories in
particular situations￿(op. cit., p.12). Identi￿cation induces people to behave more
or less in concert with the goals of organizations, even if social sanctions on deviant
behavior are absent. An important goal of an interest group involved in electoral
competition is to coordinate the voting behavior of its members1 on the political
issue that is furthered by the group.2 The literature on identity then suggests that
those identifying with the group will, to a certain extent, give priority to this issue
and disregard their political stances on other issues. Consequently, the issue may gain
more clout in the election than predicted by existing models of electoral competition.
Moreover, there is plenty of empirical evidence that group membership a⁄ects pref-
erences. Experiments have shown that even minimal groups, de￿ned by an arbitrary
label like yellow or blue and with random assignment of individuals, a⁄ect behav-
ior (Brewer, 1979, Tajfel and Turner, 1986, Schram and Sonnemans, 1996). In fact,
the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that already the decision to
join a group will tend to make the issues represented by that group relatively more
attractive (Festinger and Aronson, 1968). Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have shown
for various types of economic interactions that taking account of the phenomenon of
identi￿cation ￿that is, incorporating identity into the utility function ￿substantively
changes the conclusions of previous economic analyses. The aim of this paper is to
investigate the consequences of identi￿cation in a political economic context, using a
standard spatial model of electoral competition (see e.g. Enelow and Hinich, 1984).
More speci￿cally, our research question concerns the di⁄erential impact of the
presence of interest groups on electoral competition if voters join and identify with
an interest group that furthers an issue of importance to them. Making the usual
1Note that identi￿cation with an interest group need not necessarily imply (registered) member-
hip of that group. People may be supportive of an interest group￿ s objectives without becoming a
formal member. In this paper we will not distinguish between these two forms.
2For an empirical illustration, see Chong (1991, p.236): ￿Black organizations and institutions
helped to coordinate the preferences and actions of those who supported the civil rights movement.￿
2assumption of (weighted) Euclidean distance preferences in the absence of interest
groups, essentially, identi￿cation in this context implies that the political preferences
of voters become more lexicographic. The reason is the extra weight or priority they
attach to the issue represented by the group. Furthermore, it will be assumed that
interest group membership (identi￿cation) is positively correlated with the level of
dissatisfaction with the incumbent￿ s policy. This assumption is supported by evi-
dence on the importance of discontent and frustration for collective action (see e.g.
Kernell, 1977, Lau, 1982, Chong, 1991, Romer, 1996, Javeline, 2003). Identi￿cation
and coordination then produce our main result which relates to the winning set, i.e.
the set of policy platforms with which a challenger can defeat a given incumbent￿ s
policy position. Assuming for simplicity a two-dimensional issue space and a uniform
distribution of the voters ideal points over this space, we are able to show that the in-
troduction of interest groups in this environment typically increases the winning set.
This result is particularly important if one takes into account that in practice politi-
cal parties do not have complete information about voting behavior, urging them to
use instruments like polls for acquiring information. Our result then suggests that in
the presence of interest groups, it will be easier for the challenger to ￿nd a position
defeating the incumbent. Or, put di⁄erently, the challenger￿ s probability of winning
the election will be enhanced by interest groups.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the spatial compe-
tition model with interest groups and our main result. The proof of the main result
is outlined in Section 3, whereas the formal proofs of the results used there are rel-
egated to the Appendix. Section 4 concludes with a further discussion of relevance
and implications.
2 Spatial competition and interest groups
Two political parties, an incumbent and a challenger, are assumed to compete for
votes by selecting certain policy platforms. Platforms are represented as points in an
issue space. We take this issue space to be continuous and equal to X = B(O;K) ￿
I R2, that is, political parties can choose platforms on two dimensions from an open
ball with center at the origin O = (0;0) and radius K > 0.3 There is a continuum of
voters where each voter j is characterized by an ideal point xj2X and an issue weight
vector or pro￿le sj 2 S2 where S = fs1;s2;:::;srg, with s = s1 < s2 < ::: < sr = s.
Let4 s > 0 and, without loss of generality, s = 1. Suppose voters￿ideal points are
uniformly distributed over X and voters￿weights are independently and identically
distributed (and also independently from voters￿ ideal points) according to some
distribution on S.5 A voter￿ s utility with respect to a certain policy outcome y2X
3We will return to this assumption in Section 4.
4As will become clear when we introduce interest groups, voters with weight 0 on one of the
issues do not change their voting behavior when these interest groups enter the scene. Taking s > 0
is therefore an innocuous assumption. Moreover, the alternative assumption that strengths are
continuously distributed on [s;s] would lead to the same results.























sj = (s;t)jxj = w
￿
.
3is given by the negative of the (weighted) Euclidean distance between this policy
outcome and the voter￿ s ideal point. Formally, utility for voter j of policy outcome y
is given by6
u
























Let y be the given position of the incumbent.7 In the absence of interest groups
voters will vote for that candidate whose position will give him or her the highest
utility according to (1). In case of a tie the voter will randomize, with equal proba-
bility, between the candidates. Now de￿ne by W (y) ￿ X the set of policy platforms
z that are expected to attract (strictly) more votes than the incumbent￿ s platform y.
Clearly, the challenger￿ s objective is to select a policy platform from W (y). Notice
that by de￿nition y = 2 W (y) since a voter is indi⁄erent between a challenger and
the incumbent with identical policy platforms. An equilibrium point of the electoral
competition game is de￿ned as a platform y￿ for which the winning set is empty, i.e.
W (y￿) = ;. The uniform distribution of voters￿ideal points over the issue space X
implies that in our framework such an equilibrium point will indeed exist (cf. Plott,
1967) and is in fact given by the origin (this statement will be made more precise in
Proposition 2 in Section 3). By W (y;s) we will denote the set of policy platforms
defeating the incumbent￿ s platform y in the special case where all voters have weight
vector s.
The next step is to incorporate interest groups in the model. We model a special
interest group as being interested in the policy outcome with respect to only one of
the two issues. Moreover, for expositional reasons we are going to investigate the
situation where for every position on an issue voters can join an interest group and
where all voters join an interest group.8 Before we describe how voting behavior is
coordinated by the interest groups let us ￿rst determine how individual voters decide
which interest group to join. An individual voter with ideal position x = (x1;x2) is a
potential member of two interest groups, the interest group on the ￿rst issue located
at position x1 and the interest group on the second issue located at position x2.
Which interest group this voter joins depends upon the incumbent￿ s position and the
weights the voter attaches to the two issues. We assume that voters are more inclined
to join an interest group on a particular issue the more distant the incumbent￿ s policy
position is from their own position on that issue (see the Introduction).9 Of course,
the weight a voter attaches to the issues also comes into play. Hence we assume that,
given the incumbent policy platform y, voter j decides to join the interest group on
6Notice that, following Enelow and Hinich (1984), we assume that preferences are separable. Our
formulation implies that the indi⁄erence curves are ellipses with horizontal and vertical axes.
7It is realistic to assume that the challenger is more ￿ exible in choosing a platform, since (s)he
cannot be held responsible for the existing policy (see e.g. Kramer, 1977, and Kollman, Miller, and
Page, 1992).
8Thus, an interest group can be joined (identi￿ed with) at every position of each issue. As our
focus is on the consequences of identi￿cation we keep this part of the model as simple as possible.
9For models of interest group formation using a similar approach but applied to, respectively,
taxation and informative lobbying, see Sadiraj, Tuinstra, and van Winden (2005, 2006).








, where i 2 f1;2g.10 In this way
the population of voters is divided over the di⁄erent interest groups. Now consider
the interest group located at position x1 on the ￿rst issue. Identi￿cation with the
interest group￿ s stance (see the Introduction) stimulates its members, who take the
same position on the ￿rst issue, to vote for that political candidate which is closest
to the interest group on this issue. Thus, if y and z are the policy platforms of the
two political parties, then identi￿cation is taken to induce a member j of this interest
group to vote for the ￿rst party according to the following decision rule




jy1 ￿ x1j < jz1 ￿ x1j
jy1 ￿ x1j = jz1 ￿ x1j and








and similarly for the second party. Naturally, we will assume that the voter votes
with probability 1
2 for either policy platform if jy ￿ xjj = jz ￿ xjj. A similar decision
rule holds for members of interest groups on the other issue. The introduction of
interest groups thus e⁄ectively is equivalent with a change in the structure of voter
preferences from weighted Euclidean distance to lexicographic preferences. Similar
to W (y) we denote by W I (y) the set of policy platforms defeating the incumbent￿ s
platform y when interest groups are present.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the consequences of the introduction of
interest groups for the winning sets given an incumbent￿ s position y, i.e. the areas of
the winning sets denoted by jW (y)j and
￿ ￿W I (y)
￿ ￿. Our main result is















where ’(s) = 1+ 1
s. Then for all y 2 B(O;￿(s)K)nfOg the area of the winning set
increases in the presence of interest groups.
This result shows that for all incumbent positions y within a prespeci￿ed cir-
cle within the issue space, the winning set increases in the presence of the interest
groups. Note that this circle is shrinking as s approaches 0 and that the ray of this
circle goes to 1













2 K ￿ 0:325K, which is rather close to 1
3K already. Notice
that if the incumbent￿ s position falls outside the region speci￿ed by Theorem 1, i.e.
the incumbent platform is at least a distance ￿(s)K away from the origin, which is
the equilibrium point, the winning set for the challenger is relatively large anyway,
whether interest groups are present or not.
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Figure 1: Construction of the winning set for the benchmark model. Left panel shows
how W(y;s) can be constructed (part 2 of Proposition 2), the right panel illustrates
part 3 of Proposition 2.
3 Outline of the proof of the Theorem
In this section we will outline the proof of Theorem 1 in a number of intuitive steps.
Formal and rigorous proofs of these di⁄erent steps are relegated to the appendix. It




x 2 I R
2 : kx ￿ vk
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Hence Ec (v;w) contains all the points inside an ellipse, which is centered at the point





First we consider the benchmark model, i.e. electoral competition between polit-
ical parties in the absence of interest groups. We have the following result.
Proposition 2 Assume voters￿ideal positions are independently (across issues and
across voters) drawn from the uniform distribution on X and that voters￿weights on
each issue are independently drawn from a distribution on S and are uncorrelated
with each other and with the ideal positions. Let y be the platform of the incumbent
and let C = f(s;1);(1;s)g. Then
1. W (O) = ;,
2. W (y;s) = Es (O;y),
3. 8y 2 XnfOg;W (y) ￿
[
c2C




This result is illustrated in Figure 1. Observe that any line through the origin
O divides the issue space X in two subspaces which are equally large. Therefore,
6since ideal points are symmetrically (and uniformly) distributed over the issue space,
no other platform will be able to defeat the origin (the origin here corresponds to
the position of the generalized median voter, see Hoyer and Mayer, 1974). Now
consider an arbitrary position z in Es (O;y) (see the left panel of Figure 1). The line
l￿
s presents all positions x such that all voters with weight vector s and ideal point
x are indi⁄erent between z and y. Therefore all voters with weight vector s and an
ideal point below l￿
s will vote for z and it is then easily seen that the majority of
voters with that pro￿le will indeed vote for z (basically, since voters with ideal point
O will vote for z). This argument holds for any element of Es (O;y) and therefore




the right panel of Figure 1), which implies W (y) ￿
[
c2C
Ec (O;y). With some tedious
but straightforward computations one can then derive the upper bound from part 3
of Proposition 2.
Let us now turn to the model with interest groups. We will derive a lower bound
for the size of the winning set in the model with interest groups in a number of steps.
The results are driven by the fact that decisions of interest group members can now be
represented by lexicographic preferences, instead of by weighted Euclidean distance.
Consider all voters with a certain weight vector s 2 S2. Consider a given position y
of the incumbent. From now on we will, without loss of generality, assume y1 ￿ 0
and y2 ￿ 0. In order to determine the sizes of the interest groups take the two lines






s2, respectively. These two
lines demarcate four regions in the issue space (see Figure 2), which we denote as I
(below y), II (above y), III (to the right of y) and IV (to the left of y). For each of
the regions it is easy to determine whether voters with an ideal point in that region
(and with weight vector s) will join an interest group on the ￿rst issue or one on the
second issue.
Lemma 3 Consider voter j with ideal point xj and weight vector s.
i) If xj 2 I [ II then voter j joins the interest group on the second issue.
ii) If xj 2 III [ IV then voter j joins the interest group on the ￿rst issue.
Figure 2 also illustrates the lines ll￿ and ll+, which pass through the origin O and
lie parallel to l￿ and l+, and the regions S+ (y;s) and S￿ (y;s) which lie between l+
and ll+ and between l￿ and ll￿, respectively. The signi￿cance of these two regions
will become evident shortly.
We are now ready to prove our main results. First, in Proposition 4 we character-
ize, given the incumbent￿ s position y 6= 0 and a weight vector s, the set of positions
for the challenger that attract more than half of the voters with that weight vector.
Proposition 5 then looks at the intersection of all these sets over di⁄erent weight




￿. Finally, comparing this lower
bound with the upper bound for jW (y)j that was found in Proposition 2, Theorem
1 is proven.
7Figure 2: Illustration of the di⁄erent regions needed for determining the area of the
winning set for the interest group model. The point y corresponds to the incumbent￿ s
position. The lines l￿ and l+ through y divide the issue space in four regions: regions
I and II (below and above y respectively, containing ideal positions of voters joining
interest groups on the second issue, see Lemma 3) and the regions III and IV (to the
right and to the left of y, respectively, containing the ideal positions of voters joining
interest groups on the ￿rst issue). The shaded region between l￿ and ll￿ (between l+
and ll+) corresponds to S￿ (y;s) (S+ (y;s)).
Proposition 4 In the presence of interest groups any element of the set A(y;s)
is supported by more than half of the voters with weight vector s, where A(y;s) =
A￿ (y;s) [ A+ (y;s) and
A￿ (y;s) = fz : z1 < y1;z2 < y2g \ Es (y;w￿) \ X;
A+ (y;s) = fz : z1 < y1;z2 ￿ y2g \ Es (y;w+) \ X:





This proposition tells us that the area of S￿ (y;s) (or S+ (y;s)) de￿nes a region
A￿ (y;s) (or A+ (y;s)), which is part of an ellipse and has the property that all
positions within this region defeat the incumbent for the given weight pro￿le. The
proof of this proposition can be illustrated by the left panel in Figure 3. Pick an
arbitrary z < y and denote by m the midpoint of the line connecting z with the
incumbent￿ s position y. Now draw a vertical and a horizontal line through m. The
intersections of these lines with l+ and l￿ de￿ne two triangles, 41 and 42. By
construction (see Lemma 3) all voters with weight pro￿le s and an ideal point below
l￿ will vote for z, except those voters with ideal points in one of the two triangles.





Figure 3: Illustration of Proposition 4. The left panel shows how the set A￿(y;s) can
be constructed, the right panel show how the sets A￿(y;s) and A+(y;s) look like.
is not too large. In fact, from Figure 2 it follows that the area below l￿ can be
described as jl￿ (O)j = 1
2 jXj + jS￿ (y;s)j. Moreover, the area corresponding to the
voters that cast their vote for the incumbent is given by jXj￿(jl￿ (O)j ￿ j41 + 42j).
Using the expression for jl￿ (O)j we ￿nd that the challenger wins the election when
j41 + 42j < jS￿ (y;s)j. This inequality holds exactly for all z 2 A￿ (y;s). A similar
argument can be made for A+ (y;s). The sets A￿ (y;s) and A+ (y;s) are illustrated
in the right panel of Figure 3.
The set A(y;s) can be constructed for any weight pro￿le s. Clearly, a policy
position z which lies in the intersection \sA(y;s) of these sets has the property that
for each possible weight pro￿le a majority of the voters with this pro￿le will vote for
that policy position z. Any element of this set will therefore belong to the winning
set W I (y) and the area of this intersection then gives a lower bound for
￿ ￿W I (y)
￿ ￿.
The next proposition deals with this intersection and a lower bound for its area, for
the case with y1 > 0 and y2 > 0. For the other con￿gurations of y a similar result
can be obtained.




s, where S (y) =
inf fjS￿ (y;s)j : s1;s2 2 Sg.










We now have determined an upper bound for the area of the winning set in the
absence of interest groups (Proposition 2) and a lower bound for the area of the
winning set in the presence of interest groups (Proposition 5). Our main theorem
then simply follows from comparing these two bounds.
9Sketch of the proof of Theorem 1. From Proposition 2, part 3 we ￿nd that




Moreover, Proposition 5 implicitly gives a lower bound for
￿ ￿W I (y)
￿ ￿. Comparing the





















In this short note we have shown that the introduction of interest groups into a spa-
tial voting model of electoral competition between two political parties will typically
increase the winning set for the challenger. Since in mass elections candidates or
political parties will in general lack information concerning the distribution of voter
preferences, it can be quite di¢ cult to ￿nd winning positions. This paper suggests
that winning sets for the challenger will increase in the presence of interest groups,
thereby increasing the probability of winning for the challenger and making it harder
to locate an equilibrium point if it exists. This e⁄ect, which is driven by the (empir-
ically plausible) assumption that interest group membership is positively related to
the discontent with the incumbent￿ s policy on the relevant issue has, to our knowl-
edge, never been shown before. The e⁄ect is con￿rmed in a simulation study by
Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van Winden (2006). Moreover, this simulation study indicates
that, because of the increase in the winning set in the presence of interest groups,
separation between policy platforms increases and the rate of convergence of policy
platforms to the equilibrium point decreases.
The model we have chosen to present our main result is, of course, highly stylized.
Two ￿nal remarks are in order here. First, as can be seen from Section 3, we have
been quite conservative in providing upper and lower bounds of the relevant areas.
We therefore expect that our main result holds for a signi￿cantly larger set than the
one speci￿ed by Theorem 1. Secondly, for matters of exposition we chose as issue
space a ball around the origin, where a rectangular issue space is more common in the
literature. Actually, the issue space might be larger than this ball. A distribution of
voter preferences over for example a square or rectangle would substantively give the
same results, but would lead to a cumbersome written proof. The present assump-
tion is also motivated by the observation that voters typically do not take extreme
positions on all issues. What the precise e⁄ect of interest groups will be under a
more general speci￿cation of the (dimension of the) issue space, the distribution of
ideal points and the structure of voter preferences or in the absence of an equilibrium
point is left for future research. Note however that the result presented here holds
for any distribution of strengths, provided that this distribution is independent of the
ideal points. The main message here is that (through identi￿cation) interest groups
10will have an impact on voting behavior and thereby in￿ uence the political decision
making process, even apart from their in￿ uence on the latter through lobbying, cam-
paign contributions or endorsements, which are the channels studied in the existing
political economic literature on interest groups.
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A Proofs
This appendix contains formal proofs for the results in Section 3.
Proof of Proposition 2.
1. By symmetry, any line through the origin O divides the issue space X in two
subspaces which are equally large. The uniform distribution then implies the
same expected number of voters on either side of such a line. Therefore the ori-
gin corresponds to the position of the generalized median voter and no position
will strictly defeat it. Hence W (O) = ;.
122. Without loss of generality we assume y1 ￿ y2 > 0. Consider an arbitrary policy
position z, with zi ￿ yi;i = 1;2. We want to determine under which conditions
z 2 W (y). Let us ￿rst determine all positions x￿ such that voters with the




















2s2 (y2 ￿ z2)
: (3)
Let us denote the line de￿ned by (3) as l￿
s. Clearly, l￿
s separates the issue space
into two subspaces and all voters in the subspace below and to the left of l￿
s
vote for the challenger, if it selects position z. Now suppose l￿
s cuts the vertical
axis at some positive value. Then we can draw a line that goes through O and
that lies parallel to l￿
s. This line through O divides X in two equal subspaces,
implying that the subspace lying below and to the left of l￿
s will be larger than
the subspace above and to the right of l￿
s. Therefore, the challenger will win at
z if l￿







which de￿nes the ellipse given in the proposition. In a similar fashion the same
condition can be derived for positions z with z1 ￿ y1 and z2 > y2 and for
positions z with z1 > y1 and z2 ￿ y2. It should be clear that positions z with
z1 ￿ y1 and z2 ￿ y2 never defeat the incumbent.
3. First, we show that W (y) ￿
[
c2C
Ec (O;y): A su¢ cient condition for this to be
true is [sEs (O;y) ￿ [cEc (O;y).
























Note that s ￿
s2
s1 ￿ 1
































































and therefore x 2 Ec (O;y) with c = (1;s).
13Second, we calculate the area of
[
c2C
Ec (O;y). Recall that the surface of Ec (O;y)
is given by ￿
kyk2
c p










































We need the following de￿nitions (see Figures 2 and 3). Let ￿ denote the scalar
product operator, i.e. u ￿ v =
X
i
uivi, and let lu;v denote the line through v and
perpendicular to u, i.e. lu;v = fx : u ￿ (x ￿ v) = 0g:









These lines divide the issue space X = B(O;K) in the following four subspaces.
1. I = fx 2 X : x2 < minfl￿;l+gg;
2. II = fx 2 X : x2 > maxfl￿;l+gg
3. III = fx 2 Xn(I [ II [ l￿ [ l+) : x1 > y1g and
4. IV = fx 2 Xn(I [ II [ l￿ [ l+) : x1 < y1g
Clearly, X = I [ II [ III [ IV [ l￿ [ l+
Denote by ll￿ and ll+ the lines passing through the origin O, and parallel to l￿











x 2 I R





x 2 I R
2jmin(ll￿;l￿) ￿ x2 ￿ max(ll￿;l￿)
￿
\ X:
Using S+ (y;s) and S￿ (y;s) we de￿ne
A￿ (y;s) = fz : z1 < y1;z2 < y2g \ Es (y;w￿) \ X;
A+ (y;s) = fz : z1 < y1;z2 ￿ y2g \ Es (y;w+) \ X:




s1s2 jS￿(s;y)j: Finally A(y;s) =
A￿ (y;s) [ A+ (y;s).
14Proof of Lemma 3. We will show that if a voter has an ideal position in I then
she would prefer the group on the second issue to the group on the ￿rst one. The
result for voters from subspaces II, III and IV can be established in the same way.











We distinguish the following cases:
￿ x
j





￿ ￿ = y1 ￿ x
j
1, and
(b) minfl+;l￿g = l+. Therefore x
j







































which is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for voter j to choose the









￿ ￿ = x
j
1 ￿ y1;













which is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a voter j to choose the
group on the second issue x
j
1 = y1:





the midpoint of the line connecting z with the incumbent￿ s position y.
Now draw a vertical and a horizontal line through m and consider the intersections
of these lines with l+ and l￿. Denote these intersections by i￿; where ￿ 2 f+;￿g and
i 2 f1;2g. Hence 1+ (1￿) is the intersection between the vertical line through M1 and
l+ (l￿) and 2+ (2￿) is the intersection between the horizontal line through M2 and
l+ (l￿). Now consider the subspace L ￿(l￿ (O) ￿ (1￿1+2+2￿1￿))\X. From Lemma
3 we know that all voters in I join the interest group on the second issue and all
















15proves that the challenger at position z gets votes from voters with ideal positions in
L. Hence it gets more than half of the votes if
jS￿j > j1￿1+2+2￿1￿j
since jS￿j = jl￿ (O)j ￿ 1
2 jXj.
First, denote 41 the triangle y1+1￿ and 42 the triangle y2+2￿ and note that




























The ￿rst inequality follows from the fact that some parts of the triangles 4i; i = 1;2
might not be in X, the ￿rst equal sign follows from computation of the surface of the
two triangles, the second equality follows from the de￿nition of the midpoint M and
the ￿nal step follows from the fact that z 2 A￿ (y;s). A similar reasoning holds for
A+ (y;s). Thus, it is shown that all positions z 2 A(y;s) are expected to defeat the
incumbent.
16Proof of Proposition 5.
1. First, we show that
B ￿ \sA(y;s)







































and therefore, x 2 A￿ (y;s) ￿ A(y;s):
2. The next step consists of deriving a lower bound for the radius of B. First,
let d(O;l+) (d(O;l￿)) correspond to the distance of the origin from the line l+
(l￿), i.e.
d(O;l+) = minfkxk : x 2 l+g:
For the case we are considering (y1 > 0 and y2 > 0), we have h(y;s) = d(O;l￿)
(which means that we are focussing on A￿ (y;s)). For all s 2 S2, one has























By de￿nition we have h(y;s) ￿ kyk ￿ K. Furthermore, arcsinx > x for all
x 2 (0;1]. Using these properties we ￿nd












































Proof of Theorem 1. Let s be given. From proposition 2 we know that
jW(y)j ￿ ￿ kyk
2 p
s’(s):






, with z1 < y1
and z2 < y2 are contained in W I (y). Furthermore we found that










If this area lies in X we know that it presents a lower bound for
￿ ￿W I (y)
￿ ￿. This does
not necessarily have to be the case. Let us ￿rst compute the two points that have













. Now consider the following










. One fourth of this
ball lies in X completely. Therefore there are two possibilities. This fourth part of
the ball is contained in A￿ or it contains A￿. So we have to take the minimum of
the two lower bounds as a lower bound for
￿ ￿W I (y)
￿ ￿. Consider the ￿rst case. Then
￿ ￿W
I (y)











jW (y)j < ￿ kyk
2 p
s’(s)
So we ￿nd that, in the presence of interest groups, the size of the winning set is
expected to increase for all y satisfying
￿ ￿W I (y)










(jy1j + jy2j) > ￿ kyk
2 p
s’(s)











1+(’(s))3K, the property holds for all y 2 B (0;D1).




















Suppose, without loss of generality, that jy1j +
p
K2 ￿ y2
















Again, we will try to derive a condition on kyk























That is, for all y 2 B (0;D2), with D2 ￿ K p
1+4’(s)
p
s. This concludes the proof of
Theorem 1.
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